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ABSTRACT
Global economy has formed a huge challenge to the trust of traditional business. It’s a important problem of all
enterprise how to build a effective trust institution in the new economy. The rapid development of E-business is
bringing a turning point of trust institution. In traditional trust institution, trust means that principal controls the agent in
fact. The evolution of trust institution was closely related to the development of technology because of control. This
paper presents, with the innovation of technology and system, precondition of trust through the method of controlling
has already been out of the existence. The development of E-business will have influence on the evolution of trust
institution, Advantages of E-business can promote monitor from man-made to market-made, from control to
competition. It will build an effectual trust institution.
Keywords: trust, control, competition, E-Business, advertising game
1. INTRODUCTION
Global economy has formed a huge challenge to the
trust of traditional business. It’s an important problem of
all enterprise how to build an effective trust institution
in the new economy. The rapid development of
E-business is bringing a turning point of trust
institution.
2. THE PROBLEM AND CHALLENGE
2.1 The traditional trust
Trust is a definite expectation of other’s action
(Gambetta, 1988) as well as an active ability that engage
oneself to accept the many social institution (Zucker,
1986). Trust is necessary to reduce transaction cost, and
help business organizations operate better (Miles &
Snow, 1992). Trust becomes a pivotal factor of the
thought and philosophy of management (Miles & Greed,
1995). Trust is rooting in three patterns: process based
trust, character based trust, and institution based trust
(Zucker, 1986). Institution, especial comparability and
reciprocal experience decide the trust (Arrow, 1984).
Trust was a situation that we relied on others; it meant
dependence together with risk. Because calculativeness
is ubiquitous (Williamson, 1998), the trust of coming
from dependence means that principal controls the agent
in fact. Trust is derived from distrust. The premise of
trust is the exchange of direct interaction and sensing
knowledge. So some scholars think that management is
one art of control (Putti & Weihrich & Koontz, 1998).
2.2 Trust and technology
The evolution of trust institution is closely related to the
development of technology because of control (Kipnis,
1991). The development of technology is divided into
three stages: skills based technology, which
corresponding to the era of producing by hand; the
routine technology, which corresponding to the era of

producing by machines; informational technology,
which corresponding to the era of producing by
intelligence (Faunce, 1981). The principal cannot only
simply rely on the agent’s moral because of the
complicated technology. The dependence is more
displayed that whether the agent can better deal with the
technology, at this moment, the need of agent’s skills
and moral improved highly. It was more difficult to
control than before. Further more the way that
technology used make the implied terms of traditional
trust out of existing, more and more trades based on
multi-region and provisional colony were substituted
trades of self-region and steady colony (Kipnis, 1994),
codified knowledge which is gradually replacing the
sensual knowledge is becoming basis of the trade
(Masahiko Aoki, 2001).
3. TRUST IN E-BUSINESS: AN ADVERTISING
GAME MODEL
Because the traditional trust institution has relied on
strong ethical hypothesis, it can be described as a game
model. Players have all or part knowledge of the game
structure. The trust institution is a common strategy
choice of players, and it can be self-enforcing. We will
analyze the trust institution by an advertising game
model that is reformed by Spence’s job market model
(Spence, 1974).
3.1 Advertising game model
Because of asymmetric information, bargainors know
the quality level of their goods, buyers don’t. But the
information of quality can be transferred to buyers by
advertising. According to Spence-Mirrlees condition
(Spence & Mirrlees, 1974), there are different costs of
advertising between different quality. The cost of
advertising is inverse ratio of quality. The efficiency
improvement of different quality is different.
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Thinking of a buyer and a bargainor. Quality has two
estates: if θ = 1 , the quality is low, if θ = 2 , the
quality is high. The bargainor is clear of the real value
of θ , but the knowledge of the buyer is only the
probabilities of quality. Let the probability is p:
p (θ = 1 ) = p (θ = 2 ) = 1 / 2 .Before contracting , the
bargainor will select advertising level. Let the level is s:

s ∈ {0 ,1} , s = 0 means advertising, s = 1 means no
advertising. The cost of advertising is C ( s , θ ) = s / θ .

After advertising is observed, the buyer will decide the
price w ( s ) . The bargainor will choose whether
receiving the price or not. If being received, the buyer
has an expected value: y = θ (it is a hypothesis that
advertising isn’t influence of value), the baigainor’s
expected utility is U ( s , θ ) = w − s / θ .The buyer’s
expected utility is π ( s , θ ) = θ − w ( s ) .Otherwise,
U = π ≡ 0 . At one time, it is a hypothesis that there is
a complete market, so when the market has an
equilibrium, price will be equal to expected value and
the buyer’s expected utility is 0.
3.2 The game of trust in control
The analysis of this game model has two angle of view:
symmetric and asymmetric information games. By
symmetric information, advertising needs many costs
but has no value. So whether high with low of the
quality, bargainor will choose s = 0 , the price of low
quality is w (θ = 1 ) = 1 , the price of high quality is
w (θ = 2 ) = 2 . There is trust institution in the market
this time. But this Pareto dominance equilibrium will
not exist in asymmetric information games. If the buyer
doesn’t know θ , his expected value will be
y = 0 . 5 × 1 + 0 . 5 × 2 = 1 . 5 , the competition of
players will have a result in w = 1 . 5 . But, when the
advertising can transfer quality signal to buyers,
w = 1 . 5 would not able to be Nash equilibrium (Zhang,
1996).
Traditional trust institution is built by a hypothesis of
symmetric information games. Besides of a strong
common share of the institution, it also needs a small
self-region market. Along with the development of
technology, the bound of market is more and more
expanding. The hypothesis of traditional trust institution
is removing from the fact. For obtaining the symmetric
information, many other forcing controls are necessary,
such as quality standard, understanding of craftworks
and abilities, etc. In fact, the trust has been equal to the
control. The essence of “dependence and control” has
brought high cost, and can’t meet the demand of trust in
the times of global economy. The principal cannot far
directly control the behavior of the agents because of his
bounded rationality. Controlling has sharpened the
contradiction between the principal and agent.
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3.3 The game of trust in competition
Though the traditional business environment has
stronger regional characteristics, the conditions of the
hypothesis of the trust are easier to realize, the
controlling, as a kind of ways to form trust, can work in
a certain extent. With the innovation of technology
(modern manufacturing, modern transportation and
modern information) and system (the freedom of trade),
the modern economy becomes globally day by day,
precondition of trust through the method of controlling
has already been out of the existence. Under this
environment, the agent who is prone to calculativeness
will not promise openly, so the effective trade can only
be realized on terms that the trust is restrained from
reliably supporting (Williamson, 1998). As the
important displaying form of the technology at the third
stage, E-business is not only the handed technology, but
also is the main means to change the environment. The
development of E-business will have influence on the
evolution of trust institution.
In E-Business, by the regional difference of culture and
moral, the belief of traditional trust institution will not
be more and more common shared. Because of the
asymmetric information of quality, buyers can only
observe s not θ , so the price will only be decided by
s . Let µ (θ = 1 s ) is the buyer’s posterior probability
of low quality when he has observed s that the
bargainor selected. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium means:
(1) the bargainor selected s (θ ) , (2) the buyer knows
µ (θ = 1 s )
and decides w ( s ) by the “ s ” that he
has observed. The result is: ①by w ( s ) , s (θ ) is the
best choice of the baigainor when quality is θ ; ②by
s (θ ) , µ (θ = 1 s ) is accordant to Bayesian ruler,
w ( s ) is the best choice of

the buyer.

The equilibrium may be pooling or separating. Fist,
pooling equilibrium (PE) means the bargainor selected
same advertising in different qualities and won same
price. By s (θ ) ≡ 0 ,
⎧ s (θ = 1 ) = s (θ = 2 ) = 0
⎪ w ( 0 ) = w (1 ) = 1 . 5
(1)
⎪
( PE ) : ⎨
⎪ µ (θ = 1 s = 0 ) = 0 . 5
⎪ µ (θ = 1 s = 1 ) = 0 . 5
⎩

It means no advertising of any qualities is Pareto
dominance equilibrium. The buyer considers there is no
quality signal in advertising, so the price is equal to the
expected utility. Because of the buyer’s Pareto
dominance equilibrium is w ≡ 1 . 5 , C (1, θ ) > 0 , so
s (θ ) = 1 is impossible, the bargainor’s Pareto
dominance
equilibrium
is
no
advertising
s
(
θ
)
=
0
)(Zhang, 1996).
(
Because we assume the buyer will not rework his prior
probability when he finds s (θ ) = 1 , (PE) is Pareto
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dominance equilibrium. The invariable prior probability
in advertising game demands players have share-beliefs
of sensual knowledge and codified knowledge, by all
appearances, it could not come to existence in global
economy and E-business. If the buyer’s posterior
µ (θ = 1 s = 1 ) = 0
, it means the
probability is
quality advertised must be high, the (PE) will not come
µ (θ = 1 s = 1 ) = 0
, when the
into existence. For by
bargainor’s choice is s (θ ) = 1 , the buyer’s choice will
be w (1 ) = 2 . The high quality will select advertising,
U ( s = 1, θ = 2 ) = 2 − 1 / 2 = 1 . 5 . No advertising is
poor, U ( s = 0 , θ = 2 ) = 1 − 0 = 1 , so we will have
the separating equilibrium (SE):
⎧ s (θ = 1 ) = 0 , s (θ = 2 ) = 1
⎪ w ( 0 ) = 1, w (1 ) = 2
(2)
⎪
( SE ) : ⎨
s
(
1
0
)
1
=
=
=
µ
θ
⎪
⎪ µ (θ = 1 s = 1 ) = 0
⎩

(SE) is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When the buyer
has selected the posterior probability and the price, if
U ( s = 1, θ = 2 ) = 1 . 5 > U ( s = 0 , θ = 2 ) = 1 , the
quality is high, the best strategy is advertising; if
U ( s = 0 , θ = 1 ) = 1 ≥ U ( s = 1, θ = 1 ) = 1 , the best
strategy is no advertising when the quality is low.
Otherwise, by the baigainor’s choice, the buyer’s
posterior probability is based on Bayesian ruler, so the
price strategy is Pareto dominance, and other (SE) isn’t
being (Zhang, 1996).
4. CONCLUSIONS
The advertising level is a signal in (SE) which transfers
information of quality to buyers. Spence-Mirrlees
condition is the precondition of this game equilibrium.
When the same advertising is selected, the cost of high
quality is lesser than low quality , the high quality will
have enough incentive to separate itself from others by
advertising. Otherwise, for wining same price, the low
quality will have enough incentive to simulate the high
quality by same advertising strategy. Thus the buyer will
not believe the advertising as a quality signal. It will
bring on market failure if there is not enough quality
information in other ways. The trust isn’t being. So we
will see the conclusions as follows:
1. In global economy and E-business, because of
scarcity of sensual knowledge, the condition of strong
ethical hypothesis in traditional trust institution is not
being. The new trust’s game model should be more and
more based on “an invisible hand” (Smith, 1776). The
ethical hypothesis is feeble.
2. In E-Business, Spence-Mirrlees condition makes it
clear that the system assuring of real advertising is
necessary. If the discount factor δ > 0 , players will
have enough incentive to tell the truth in infinitely
repeated games (Rasmusen, 1994). It is necessary to

build and improve the stable common E-Business
market by strong legal system. The third party will
regulate players’ actions in market, such as quality,
reality of advertising, etc. The certification authorities
and the continuous open newsreel of business can make
the cost is too expensive to lie.
3. If the baigainors’ quality information can help buyers
purchase properly, advertising can improve the effect of
resource allocation. By taking the advantages of
E-business that can help to share the mass codified
knowledge, purchase and supply on-line can bring an
effect of vendue. The good-right order can translate
from traditional mode such as prior plan, unite control,
posterior mediation, into the mode of contract that based
on real product (Masahiko Aoki, 2001). Lesser
asymmetry and uncertainty information will make
enough incentive of the bargainor to improve quality. At
one time, opening competition can promote monitor
from man-made to market-made by the endogenous
punishment mechanism by constantly repeated games. It
is from control to competition.
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